The following is a very rough excerpt from the first iteration of my book draft. Since none of this material will appear in my current draft, I've decided to make it available here.
The fascinating failure of Russia's early animal warfare program highlights the "anything goes" mentality of World War II-era weapons development.
The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the supreme military authority of the Soviet Union, first approved the use of dogs for combat purposes on August 23, 1924. Order № 1089 established a special commission to oversee the dog training, as well as determine their relevance for further study. Moscow Oblast (or Podmoskovye) was selected as the home for a specialized dog training academy at the Central School of Small Arms and Tactical Training. The primary intent for the use of dogs was for combat assistance, supplies transport, message carriers, tracking, and removing injured soldiers from the battlefield via sled. Although various breeds were selected for training, German Sheppards were preferred due to their fearlessness, speed, strength, and perceived ease in training. In 1928 the school was restructured and renamed the Research Institute of Dog Handling, and by 1930 the program expanded to twelve training schools. Three of those facilities focused exclusively on training explosives-carrying dogs. The Red Army established the first official “tank destroyer” dog unit by 1935.
Several leading animal scientists were enlisted to help organize the wide-scale training program. In their first proposal, a dog was supposed to carry a bomb, strapped to its body, and reach a specific static target. Then the dog would release the bomb by pulling with its teeth a self-releasing belt and return to the operator. The bomb would then be detonated either by a timer or remote control, though the latter was too rare and expensive for that time. A group of dogs practiced for half a year, but even the smartest ones could not master the task. They performed well on a single target, but became confused after the target or location was changed and often returned to the operator with the bomb unreleased. Considering the proposed time-delay detonator, this might only kill the dog and its senders.
The final method was developed just prior to deployment in 1940. In the manner of pack animals, medium-sized dogs carried demolition charges on both sides of their backs. These charges were connected to a spindle, containing the igniter contact, fastened to the dog’s back. The dogs were trained to hide under approaching tanks. In doing so, the dog inadvertently brought the upright spindle, which was about 15 centimeters long, into contact with the belly of the tank and set off the charge. The dogs were also trained to advance on concrete-reinforced pillboxes, bunkers, armored covers, shelters, artillery positions, and ammunition and fuel storage facilities.
In response to Germany’s superior tank technology, all dog schools were converted to tank destroyer divisions. In desperate need of tank defense, the Central School hastily formed 10 fighter units. Three cadet battalions were sent to the front near Gomel, Bryansk, and the company created the 1st and 2nd Army units that fought at Moscow and at the Kalinin Front. During Germany’s autumn offensive in 1941 against Moscow, the Russians first deployed their mine dogs to impede incoming enemy tanks.
With the appearance of an enemy tank on the battlefield, the dog was released from the trench. As soon as it identified the target and demonstrated readiness to move towards it, the safety pin of the mine was extracted from the jacket. From this point on, the double-arm lever sensor was retained in the vertical position, rendering the mine in the firing position. Packed with 12.4 kg of TNT, the charge was sufficient enough to penetrate the less armored underside of most tanks.
In June of 1949, a series of reports were prepared by a committee of former German generals and general staff corps officers at the U.S. European Command Historical Division Interrogation Enclosure in Neustadt, Germany. Interviews were conducted with detainees in late 1947 and early 1948. According to one German officer’s report:
“An attack on our tanks by mine carrying dogs was, thanks to the alertness of our tank crew and infantry, rendered harmless by shooting the dogs.”
Another officer further explained the ineptitude of the Russian dog program, stating:
“News of this insidious improvisation caused some alarm in the panzer units and made them fire at all approaching dogs on sight. The author, who saw action before Moscow with his panzer division, has no knowledge of any case where a German tank was destroyed by a Russian mine dog. On the other hand, Russian prisoners of war reported that several mine dogs fleeing from the fire of German tanks sought protection underneath Russian tanks, which promptly blew up. One thing is certain: the specter of the mine dogs ceased just as abruptly as it had begun.”
Relatively early in their campaign, Russia’s Action Group acknowledged the futility of the anti-tank dog program. A handwritten summary report in October of 1941 by a Commander in the tank dog unit, observed:
1. Most of the dogs refuse to work immediately and [strived] to jump into the trench, exposing infantry ([causing] six accidents)
2. Nine dogs, after a brief run in the right direction, began to rush from side to side, frightened by the explosions and artillery shells, tried to hide in craters, pits, [and] climbed under the shelter… Others, due to the fact that they [attempted] to come back, had to [be destroyed by] small-arms fire.
3. Three dogs [were] killed [by] Nazis rifle fire and [taken] with them. Attempts to recapture the dead dogs had been made.
4. Supposedly four dogs exploded near the German tanks, but confirmation of the fact that they [had] disabled the tanks [we] do not have.
The Action Group cited in the conclusion of their report numerous causes for failure. Among those was the shortage of properly trained dogs and improper training methods. It was decided that further development of this method of warfare was feasible, but tangible results of subsequent attempts to use dogs as an anti-tank means were not studied.
Some in the Red Army reported unprecedented success of the anti-tank units. In March of 1942, Lt. Gen. Lelyushenko reported that the anti-tank dogs were an integral part of their defense during the German defeat at Moscow and the enemy tanks were on the run from the dog detachment. An Operational Summary from July of 1942 stated that an advance of 50 German tanks was met by the dog unit led by lieutenant Shantsev, resulting in seven tanks being set on fire. Furthermore, the 2nd Army reported in September of 1943 the destruction of 15 German tanks by anti-tank dogs during the battles near Belgorod. There is speculation that these reports may have been propaganda fabricated solely for continued support of anti-tank dog training program. After 1942, the use of anti-tank dogs by the Soviet Army rapidly declined, and the training schools were redirected to producing the more needed mine-seeking and delivery dogs. However, training of anti-tank dogs continued until June 1996.
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