Abstract
Alexander the Great died in Babylon in 323 BC. His death at age 32 followed a 2-week febrile illness. Speculated causes of death have included poisoning, assassination, and a number of infectious diseases. One incident, mentioned by Plutarch but not considered by previous investigators, may shed light on the cause of Alexander’s death. The incident, which occurred as he entered Babylon, involved a flock of ravens exhibiting unusual behavior and subsequently dying at his feet. The inexplicable behavior of ravens is reminiscent of avian illness and death weeks before the first human cases of West Nile virus infection were identified in the United States. We posit that Alexander may have died of West Nile encephalitis...
http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/9/12/03-0288_article.htm
Read the article and leave your thoughts in the comments below.
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Wednesday, January 25, 2012
Web Link Wednesday #3: No Main File Records
On November 20 of last year, I filed a FIOA request with the FBI. It stated, in part:
"Under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. subsection 552, I am requesting information or records on this Agency’s investigation of the West Nile virus outbreak of 1999 in the U.S., the possibility its existence in the Western Hemisphere may have been a biological attack (possibly originating from Iraq or Cuba)..."
This was not my first "unable to identify main file records" response, and I believe it won't be my last. According to Jason Leopold of Truthout, this course of action by the FBI is far from unique.
"Have you ever filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the FBI and received a written response from the agency stating that it could not locate records responsive to your request?
"Have you ever filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the FBI and received a written response from the agency stating that it could not locate records responsive to your request?
If so, there's a chance the FBI may have found some documents, but for unknown reasons, the agency's FOIA analysts determined it was not responsive and "blackballed" the file, crucial information the FBI withholds from a requester when it issues a "no records" response..."
Continued at http://www.truth-out.org/revealed-fbis-secretive-practice-blackballing-files/1326811421.
Read the article and leave your thoughts in the comments below.
Continued at http://www.truth-out.org/revealed-fbis-secretive-practice-blackballing-files/1326811421.
Read the article and leave your thoughts in the comments below.
Tuesday, January 24, 2012
History Highlights #3: Anti-Tank Dogs
The following is a very rough excerpt from the first iteration of my book draft. Since none of this material will appear in my current draft, I've decided to make it available here.
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The fascinating failure of Russia's early animal warfare program highlights the "anything goes" mentality of World War II-era weapons development.
The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the supreme military authority of the Soviet Union, first approved the use of dogs for combat purposes on August 23, 1924. Order № 1089 established a special commission to oversee the dog training, as well as determine their relevance for further study. Moscow Oblast (or Podmoskovye) was selected as the home for a specialized dog training academy at the Central School of Small Arms and Tactical Training. The primary intent for the use of dogs was for combat assistance, supplies transport, message carriers, tracking, and removing injured soldiers from the battlefield via sled. Although various breeds were selected for training, German Sheppards were preferred due to their fearlessness, speed, strength, and perceived ease in training. In 1928 the school was restructured and renamed the Research Institute of Dog Handling, and by 1930 the program expanded to twelve training schools. Three of those facilities focused exclusively on training explosives-carrying dogs. The Red Army established the first official “tank destroyer” dog unit by 1935.
Several leading animal scientists were enlisted to help organize the wide-scale training program. In their first proposal, a dog was supposed to carry a bomb, strapped to its body, and reach a specific static target. Then the dog would release the bomb by pulling with its teeth a self-releasing belt and return to the operator. The bomb would then be detonated either by a timer or remote control, though the latter was too rare and expensive for that time. A group of dogs practiced for half a year, but even the smartest ones could not master the task. They performed well on a single target, but became confused after the target or location was changed and often returned to the operator with the bomb unreleased. Considering the proposed time-delay detonator, this might only kill the dog and its senders.
The final method was developed just prior to deployment in 1940. In the manner of pack animals, medium-sized dogs carried demolition charges on both sides of their backs. These charges were connected to a spindle, containing the igniter contact, fastened to the dog’s back. The dogs were trained to hide under approaching tanks. In doing so, the dog inadvertently brought the upright spindle, which was about 15 centimeters long, into contact with the belly of the tank and set off the charge. The dogs were also trained to advance on concrete-reinforced pillboxes, bunkers, armored covers, shelters, artillery positions, and ammunition and fuel storage facilities.
In response to Germany’s superior tank technology, all dog schools were converted to tank destroyer divisions. In desperate need of tank defense, the Central School hastily formed 10 fighter units. Three cadet battalions were sent to the front near Gomel, Bryansk, and the company created the 1st and 2nd Army units that fought at Moscow and at the Kalinin Front. During Germany’s autumn offensive in 1941 against Moscow, the Russians first deployed their mine dogs to impede incoming enemy tanks.
With the appearance of an enemy tank on the battlefield, the dog was released from the trench. As soon as it identified the target and demonstrated readiness to move towards it, the safety pin of the mine was extracted from the jacket. From this point on, the double-arm lever sensor was retained in the vertical position, rendering the mine in the firing position. Packed with 12.4 kg of TNT, the charge was sufficient enough to penetrate the less armored underside of most tanks.
In June of 1949, a series of reports were prepared by a committee of former German generals and general staff corps officers at the U.S. European Command Historical Division Interrogation Enclosure in Neustadt, Germany. Interviews were conducted with detainees in late 1947 and early 1948. According to one German officer’s report:
Several leading animal scientists were enlisted to help organize the wide-scale training program. In their first proposal, a dog was supposed to carry a bomb, strapped to its body, and reach a specific static target. Then the dog would release the bomb by pulling with its teeth a self-releasing belt and return to the operator. The bomb would then be detonated either by a timer or remote control, though the latter was too rare and expensive for that time. A group of dogs practiced for half a year, but even the smartest ones could not master the task. They performed well on a single target, but became confused after the target or location was changed and often returned to the operator with the bomb unreleased. Considering the proposed time-delay detonator, this might only kill the dog and its senders.
The final method was developed just prior to deployment in 1940. In the manner of pack animals, medium-sized dogs carried demolition charges on both sides of their backs. These charges were connected to a spindle, containing the igniter contact, fastened to the dog’s back. The dogs were trained to hide under approaching tanks. In doing so, the dog inadvertently brought the upright spindle, which was about 15 centimeters long, into contact with the belly of the tank and set off the charge. The dogs were also trained to advance on concrete-reinforced pillboxes, bunkers, armored covers, shelters, artillery positions, and ammunition and fuel storage facilities.
In response to Germany’s superior tank technology, all dog schools were converted to tank destroyer divisions. In desperate need of tank defense, the Central School hastily formed 10 fighter units. Three cadet battalions were sent to the front near Gomel, Bryansk, and the company created the 1st and 2nd Army units that fought at Moscow and at the Kalinin Front. During Germany’s autumn offensive in 1941 against Moscow, the Russians first deployed their mine dogs to impede incoming enemy tanks.
With the appearance of an enemy tank on the battlefield, the dog was released from the trench. As soon as it identified the target and demonstrated readiness to move towards it, the safety pin of the mine was extracted from the jacket. From this point on, the double-arm lever sensor was retained in the vertical position, rendering the mine in the firing position. Packed with 12.4 kg of TNT, the charge was sufficient enough to penetrate the less armored underside of most tanks.
In June of 1949, a series of reports were prepared by a committee of former German generals and general staff corps officers at the U.S. European Command Historical Division Interrogation Enclosure in Neustadt, Germany. Interviews were conducted with detainees in late 1947 and early 1948. According to one German officer’s report:
“An attack on our tanks by mine carrying dogs was, thanks to the alertness of our tank crew and infantry, rendered harmless by shooting the dogs.”
Another officer further explained the ineptitude of the Russian dog program, stating:
“News of this insidious improvisation caused some alarm in the panzer units and made them fire at all approaching dogs on sight. The author, who saw action before Moscow with his panzer division, has no knowledge of any case where a German tank was destroyed by a Russian mine dog. On the other hand, Russian prisoners of war reported that several mine dogs fleeing from the fire of German tanks sought protection underneath Russian tanks, which promptly blew up. One thing is certain: the specter of the mine dogs ceased just as abruptly as it had begun.”
Relatively early in their campaign, Russia’s Action Group acknowledged the futility of the anti-tank dog program. A handwritten summary report in October of 1941 by a Commander in the tank dog unit, observed:
1. Most of the dogs refuse to work immediately and [strived] to jump into the trench, exposing infantry ([causing] six accidents)
2. Nine dogs, after a brief run in the right direction, began to rush from side to side, frightened by the explosions and artillery shells, tried to hide in craters, pits, [and] climbed under the shelter… Others, due to the fact that they [attempted] to come back, had to [be destroyed by] small-arms fire.
3. Three dogs [were] killed [by] Nazis rifle fire and [taken] with them. Attempts to recapture the dead dogs had been made.
4. Supposedly four dogs exploded near the German tanks, but confirmation of the fact that they [had] disabled the tanks [we] do not have.
The Action Group cited in the conclusion of their report numerous causes for failure. Among those was the shortage of properly trained dogs and improper training methods. It was decided that further development of this method of warfare was feasible, but tangible results of subsequent attempts to use dogs as an anti-tank means were not studied.
Some in the Red Army reported unprecedented success of the anti-tank units. In March of 1942, Lt. Gen. Lelyushenko reported that the anti-tank dogs were an integral part of their defense during the German defeat at Moscow and the enemy tanks were on the run from the dog detachment. An Operational Summary from July of 1942 stated that an advance of 50 German tanks was met by the dog unit led by lieutenant Shantsev, resulting in seven tanks being set on fire. Furthermore, the 2nd Army reported in September of 1943 the destruction of 15 German tanks by anti-tank dogs during the battles near Belgorod. There is speculation that these reports may have been propaganda fabricated solely for continued support of anti-tank dog training program. After 1942, the use of anti-tank dogs by the Soviet Army rapidly declined, and the training schools were redirected to producing the more needed mine-seeking and delivery dogs. However, training of anti-tank dogs continued until June 1996.
Some in the Red Army reported unprecedented success of the anti-tank units. In March of 1942, Lt. Gen. Lelyushenko reported that the anti-tank dogs were an integral part of their defense during the German defeat at Moscow and the enemy tanks were on the run from the dog detachment. An Operational Summary from July of 1942 stated that an advance of 50 German tanks was met by the dog unit led by lieutenant Shantsev, resulting in seven tanks being set on fire. Furthermore, the 2nd Army reported in September of 1943 the destruction of 15 German tanks by anti-tank dogs during the battles near Belgorod. There is speculation that these reports may have been propaganda fabricated solely for continued support of anti-tank dog training program. After 1942, the use of anti-tank dogs by the Soviet Army rapidly declined, and the training schools were redirected to producing the more needed mine-seeking and delivery dogs. However, training of anti-tank dogs continued until June 1996.
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Next week:
Monday, January 23, 2012
Mailbag Monday #3: "We're Sorry, But it will Cost You"
n early November of last year
Page 2 goes on to explain that since they are processing a large number of FOIA requests, there are "unavoidable delays". This means that not only did I not receive a response in 20 days (as the FOIA requires), but there is no timeline as to when I can expect a response. I suppose this all seems fair ... since they didn't conduct an investigation and all...
Be sure to come back in a couple days for a related Web Link Wednesday.
Friday, January 20, 2012
Document Dump #2: Make (Gay) Love, Not War
This document actually got a little bit of press when it was released by the Sunshine Project (I believe it was in 2005) through a Freedom of Information Act request. In 1994 the Wright Laboratory in Ohio, a predecessor to today's United States Air Force Research Laboratory, produced a three-page proposal on a variety of possible nonlethal chemical weapons.
While the proposal includes a "halitosis bomb" and insect attractants, the real highlight is:
"One distasteful but completely non-lethal example would be strong aphrodisiacs, especially if the chemical also caused homosexual behaviour."
The project was budgeted for $7.5 million over 6 years. It remains unknown what results were achieved and if the project was ever cancelled.
Download (PDF, 1.19 MB)
As always, feel free to leave your thoughts on the subject in the comments or on the Facebook page.
Download (PDF, 1.19 MB)
As always, feel free to leave your thoughts on the subject in the comments or on the Facebook page.
Wednesday, January 18, 2012
Tuesday, January 17, 2012
History Highlights #2: "Operation Acoustic Kitty"
The following is a very rough excerpt from the first iteration of my book draft. Since none of this material will appear in my current draft, I've decided to make it available here.
____________
The CIA has never publicly confirmed or denied the Iranian allegations.
The Central Intelligence Agency's desire to develop remote-controlled covert eavesdropping critters continues... (read part one here).
It appears that as early as 1966, certain aspects of MKULTRA's animal espionage program were restructured. Similar to the doctrine of Subproject 94, the CIA sought to determine “the feasibility and practicality of the animal control, signaling, guidance, and location system”. According to Victor Marchetti, former special assistant to the Deputy Director of the CIA, "[t]he idea behind "Operation Acoustic Kitty" was to develop an audio device that could function despite extraneous noises.” Technical feasibility was demonstrated that year and operational feasibility was conducted in July of 1967. From September through December of 1967, the CIA analyzed the program goals and requirements. After concluding their initial analysis, the project received full funding that December.
The program’s initial objective was to get an animal to a remote point and back again. Cats and dogs were chosen for study since they are common in most parts of the world. Researchers cautioned, however, needs might dictate that "smaller or larger animals be investigated for other kinds of missions". Two areas determined to be in need of critical investigation were the development of guidance methods, as well as maximum range capability. Utilization of a radio frequency link was mandatory in the development of a guidance system. One proposal was the development of continuous and intermittent information inputs systems. By late 1967 a number of cats were undergoing training. No evidence exists supporting the implementation of canine studies, although it was again proposed that dogs could also be used in the same manner and may be easier to train.
A CIA report from July 1968 thoroughly outlines the cat training techniques, largely based on systems proposed by famed behaviorist B. F. Skinner. The Agency was interested in biological factors such as attention span, physical endurance, total range, and effect on different reinforcement schedules. The training protocol involved systematically increasing the complexity and skill level of the animal response under the conditions of an expanding and frequently changing environment. They conditioned the animals to search for targets and respond to the targets once they found them. Auditory cues were supplied to the animals to aid them in their search for targets. The auditory cues were a continuous signal when the animal was heading towards the proper target, a signal meaning turn to the left and a signal meaning turn right. These signals were used in different combination depending on the particular approach in training.
Although many details of "Operation Acoustic Kitty" remain classified to this day, Marchetti provided this insight in 1986: “They slit the cat open, put batteries in him, [and] wired him up. The tail was used as an antenna. They made a monstrosity. They tested him and tested him. They found he would walk off the job when he got hungry, so they put another wire in to override that. Finally, they’re ready. They took it out to a park bench and said “Listen to those two guys. Don’t listen to anything else – not the birds, no cat or dog – just those two guys!”... They put him out of the van, and a taxi comes and runs him over. There they were, sitting in the van with all those dials, and the cat was dead!” Marchetti also went on to state: “It was twenty five million dollars down the drain. Twenty five million dollars was a lot of money then.” Dr. Jeffrey Richelson, a senior fellow at the National Security Archive, said of the project, "I'm not sure for how long after the operation the cat would have survived even if it hadn't been run over."
Declared a complete failure, the Acoustic Kitty program was abruptly cancelled. An internal CIA memo acknowledged the hard work and dedication of the individuals involved:
"Our final examination of trained cats convinced us that the program would not lend itself in a practical sense to our highly specialized needs. The work on this problem over the years reflects great credit on the personnel that guided it, whose energy and imagination could be models for scientific pioneers."
However, some in the CIA believed the experiments should continue. On March 13, 1969, a memo titled "Animal Studies Projects" requested further funding for the following fiscal year:
"I understand that there are no funds programmed for R & D support of the trained animal program for FY 1970. I think a modest level of forward looking R & D activity designed to improve the guidance systems and operational versatility of various animals should be maintained. I, therefore, recommend that you approve such research effort[s] for FY 1970."
It remains unclear whether or not the funding was appropriated, but more recent reports indicate a possibility the Acoustic Kitty project lives on to this day in some capacity. In a July 2007 editorial for the Iranian newspaper Resalat, Saleh Eskandari wrote:
"A few weeks ago, 14 squirrels equipped with espionage systems of foreign intelligence services were captured by [Iranian] intelligence forces along the country's borders. These trained squirrels, each of which weighed just over 700 grams, were released on the borders of the country for intelligence and espionage purposes. According to the announcement made by Iranian intelligence officials, alert police officials caught these squirrels before they could carry out any task.
Fixing GPS devices, bugging instruments and advanced cameras in the bodies of trained animals like squirrels, mice, hamsters, etc, are among modern methods of collecting intelligence. Given the fast speed and the special physical features of these animals, they provide special capabilities for spying operations. Once the animals return to their place of origin, the intelligence gathered by them is then offloaded…"
Fixing GPS devices, bugging instruments and advanced cameras in the bodies of trained animals like squirrels, mice, hamsters, etc, are among modern methods of collecting intelligence. Given the fast speed and the special physical features of these animals, they provide special capabilities for spying operations. Once the animals return to their place of origin, the intelligence gathered by them is then offloaded…"
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Next week: Russia's Anti-Tank Dogs
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